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NOTES.
JURISDICTION OVER

INT PERSONAL ACTIONS.-TO
.Ko-RESIDEN-TS

render a valid judgment in a personal action, a court must first have
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant., Consequently, before
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1887).
(171)
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giving effect to a foreign judgment under the doctrines of conflicts
of laws, a court may always investigate the assertion of jurisdiction
by the foreign court.2 And though, under the Constitution of the
United States, each state must give full faith and credit to the judgments of the other states, 3 this provision does hot preclude a primary
inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court which gave the judgment.'
Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, such judgments
may be directly questioned and their enforcement, even in the state
rendering the judgment, resisted on the ground that the defendant is
being deprived of his property without due process of law.'
' How, then, is this jurisdiction obtained? Justice Holmes has
said: 'The foundation of jurisdktion is physical power, although in
civilized times it is not nedessary to maintain that power throughout
proceedings properly begun." 6 Jurisdiction is obtained generally by
service of process personally on the defendant while he is within
the state, or by reason of the defendant's consent. "The courts of
the United States only regard judgments of the state courts establishing personal demands as having validity or as importing verity
where they have been rendered on personal citation of 'the party, or,
what is the same thing, of those empowered to receive process for
him, or upon his voluntary appearance."
Two exceptions to this
rule have been recognized. Based on the control a sovereignty possesses over all persons domiciled within its borders, and the allegiance such a person owes to its laws,8 state statutes providing for
constructive or substituted serVice on such persons have been held
constitutional. 9 Another exception has arisen in the case of a foreign
corporation doing business within a state, and various types of statutes
allowing service 'on these corporations have been upheld. 0 It is
'Wimer v. Wimer, 8z Va. 89o (1888). Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.),

sec. 7 et seq.
"Aidie 4, s.

z.

'D'Arcy v. Ketchum, ii How. i65 (U. S. i8so).

&Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, note x; L. P. McGehee, Due Process of Law,
page 85 et seq.

'McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. go (1917).
'St. Clair v. Cox, io6 U. S. 35o (x8f.).
'Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. 578, 58o (N. Y, 1884).
'For a summary of all the cases showing the attitude of the United
States Supreme Court on the validity of such service under the Fourteenth
Amendment, se6 C. G. Burdick, Service as a Requirement of Due Process in
Actions in Personam, 2o MIcH. L. REv. 422.

"For a scholarly discussion of this subject see G. C. Henderson, Position
, of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law. The courts have
had great difficulty in-finding a tenable theory on which to found this jurisdiction. Based on the power to exclude, the state may, as a condition of entrance, require the foreign corporation to appoint an agent in the state on
whom service may be made in actions arising within that state. Penna. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917). Statutes
are upheld, however, which simply provide that if the corporation does bust-
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fully recognized that corporations differ from individuals in this respect. "A corporation, being an artificial being, can only act through
agents, and only through them can it be reached, and process must
therefore be served upon them. . . . The case is unlike that of
suits against individuals. They can act by themselves, and upon
them process can be directly served." "I And the United States Supreme Court has properly refused to apply the doctrines as to service
on foreign corporations to the case of non-resident individuals doing business within a state.1 2
In Pawloski v. Hess,"3 a state statute provided that "the operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a public way in the
commonwealth .
.
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of the registrar . . . to be his true
and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in
any action or proceeding against him growing out of any accident
or collision in which said non-resident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a way." The statute also provided'
that notice of the service be sent by registered mail to the defendant.'
The plaintiff was injured in a collision with defendant's car while
the latter, who was a resident of Pennsylvania, was driving in Massachusetts. He instituted an action for damages, the registrar was
served according to the statute, and notice was sent to the defendant
ness within the state, service may be made on one of its agents, or on a state
official. Lafayette Fire Ins. Co. v. French, i8 How. 40 (U. S. 1855). The
most usual theory is that the corporation has impliedly consented to be bound
by the service, though the courts recognize this to be a mere fiction. Smolic
v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., =2 Fed. 148 (D. C. x915). As" stated
in the text, this doctrine is not applied to non-resident individuals. See alsd
i zfra, note 12.
"Justice Field in St. Clair v. Cox, supra, note 7.
'Flexner v. Faison, 248 U. S. 289 (1919). Since a corporation engaged
in interstate commerce cannot be excluded, but a requirement that it appoint
an agent td accept service is not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, Int. Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914), it is argued
that the power to exclude (see note io, supra) cannot be said to be the basis
of this right of the state, and that, therefore, the state should have the same
right as regards non-resident individuals doing business within the state.
Austin Scott, Business Jurisdiction Over Non-residents, 32 HARV. L. REv.
871; C. G. Burdick, supra. note 9. This would involve a direct overruling
of Flexner v. Farson, and it is submitted the argument is questionable. As
stated in the text, corporations are greatly different from individuals, and
there is no reason to apply a fictional theory of jurisdiction to the latter
just because it is applied to the former. Though it might tend to consistency,
it is better to be inconsistent and partly correct, than consistently wrong.
Further. Mr. Henderson (sut ra, note io) has pointed out that the real basis
on which these corporation cases may be justified, and undoubtedy the thought
which the courts have had in mind, is one not applicable to indiv iduals at all.
That is the theory that when it does business within a state, a corporation is
actually present in that state.
i 144 N. M. 760 (Massachusetts, September 20, 1924).
"'Mass. G. L. c. go, as amended by St. 1923, c. 431, sec. 2.
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in Pennsylvania. It was held that the Massachusetts court acquired
jurisdiction by virtue of this service.
The assertion of jurisdiction in this case can be justified under
the rules of jurisdiction we have examined, only if the act of driving in the state can be deemed equivalent to an actual appointment of
the registrar to accept service. The court based its decision principally on two recent cases in the United States Supreme Court,'which
we must now examine carefully in the light of the principles of
jurisdiction laid down above. Though a state cannot exclude an individual from its territory,"5 it may, in the proper exercise of its
police power, make reasonable regulations concerning the manner in
which that individual uses its highways. In Hendrick v. Maryland,6
a state statute providing that a non-resident motorist should not drive
on the highways of the state unless he had first obtained aspeciallicense
was held constitutional. Justice McReynolds said: "The movement
of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and
serious danger to the public. . ..
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform
regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the
operation over its highways of all motor vehicles, those moving in
interstate commerce as well as others.

.

.

. This is but an exer-

cise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the
states, and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and
comfort of their citizens." In Kane v.New Jersey,7 a statute with
similar requirements about a license also provided that the non-resident motorist should file a power of attorney with a state official
authorising him to accept service in any action caused by the operation of the vehicle within the state. This statute was held constitutional. After quoting the above excerpt from the Hendrick case,
Justice Brandeis continued: "We know that ability to enforce criminal and civil penalties for transgression is an aid to securing observance of laws. And in view of the speed of the automobile and
the habits of men, we cannot say that the legislature of New Jersey
was unreasonable in believing that the ability to establish, by legal
proceedings within the state, any financial liability of non-resident
owners, was essential to public safety."
In this last case, regulation under the police power has concerned itself with the obtaining of jurisdiction. Whether this is a
justifiable exercise of this power is questionable. It is submitted
that the power should concern itself with and act upon the motorist
only so long as be is within the state, and not attempt to give the
' 1One of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution
is the free right to ingress and egress. See W. J. Meyers, Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens, .iMicH. L. Rnv. 364.
235 U. S.61o (1914).
242 U. S. x6o (x9z6).
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state control over him after he has departed. However that may be,
there is no difficulty in reconciling this decision with the principles
of jurisdiction. When the defendant has filed the required power of
That he would be subject to penalty if he did not file this authority
does not make his volition any the less actual. Suppose, however, he
had driven through the state without filing the power of attorney.
Though liable to the statutory penalty, he cannot be said to have
authorized a form of service by wrongfully omitting to do an act
which, if actually performed, would have amounted to such authority. Similarly, though a statute provides that driving a car over
the roads "shall be deemed to be equivalent" to an appointment toaccept service, there has been no real authority given by
the act of driving the car. The jurisdiction is based on a convenient fiction by which the true theory is attempted to be evaded.
"The constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction," and where
jurisdiction is to be based on the consent of the individual defendant to it, courts have always required this consent to
be real."' In Copin v. Adansmi," the defendant was a nonresident who had become a stockholder in a French company. By
the law of France, stockholders in French companies were "deemed
domiciled" at the office of a state official for the service of process.
The English court, on this point by itself, refused to recognize the
jurisdiction of the French court over the person of the defendant. A
French law providing that a certain act of a non-resident should be
"deemed" to have a certain consequence, did not make that consequence actual. There was no real consent by the defendant to submit himself
to the jurisdiction, and the judgment was consequently
2
invalid. 1
The court argues that the difference between the statute under
consideration and the one in the Kane case is "immaterial in its constitutional aspects," and that the one statute is "no more harsh in
its operation" than the other. In the first place, there is a great
practical difference between the two statutes. Under the New Jersey law the defendant is actually aware that he is submitting himself
to the jurisdiction of the State courts by being required to file the
power of attorney; whereas under the Massachusetts law, he is very
probably ignorant that his act will entail such a consequence. Secondly, though the police power has been extended very far in the
'Justice Holmes in Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347 (1917).
"See J. H. Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, 26 HA.v. L.
REv. 283. Mr. Beale says, "It is to be remembered that . . . no provision
of law can extend jurisdiction over the party, but his own consent is necesmsary; and we must find this consent in fact, if he is to be held."
L. R. 9 Exch. 345 (1874).
' It was also proved, however, that this same provision appeared in the
articles 'of association, to which the defendant had subscribed. On this point,
the English court did uphold the jurisdiction of the French court, because
the defendant had voluntarily contracted to submit himself to the jurisdic-

tion of the latter court.
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Kane case, it has been seen that the assertion of jurisdiction there
can be justified on theory, because there has been actual authority
given to accept service. The Massachusetts statute actually goes
one step farther, and this step has carried the case over the line.
The statute unwairrantedly extends the state's power by giving it jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant on an authority to accept
service which the defendant did not actually give. If the case is
upheld, its decision will stand as a direct departure from the established theories of jurisdiction. It is submitted that this departure
should not be made, and that the decision is, therefore, unsound.
A determination of this question will. undoubtedly be made by the
United States Supreme Court, either on direct appeal from the
Massachusetts court, or when the plaintiff attempts to enforce his
judgment in Pennsylvania.
J. C.W.
REVIEW OF ABSENTEE VOTERS LEGISLATION -IN

PENNSYLVA-

NIA.-In the recent decision of Lancaster City's Fifth Ward Election,1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has declared the Absentee
Voters Act of 1923 2 to be unconstitutional. The attempts in this

state to allow absentee voting have been failures, and in view of the
fact that Pennsylvania was probably the pioneer in such legislation,
now so important as to be adopted in over forty states," and that
recently in Missouri 4 and North Carolina 5 such laws have been held
not to contravene constitutional provisions similar to the one supposed to apply in the Pennsylvania case, an examination into the
causes of these failures should be of interest. In order to understand the unfortunate result, a review of the history .of this legislation is necessary.
In 1839, in a spirit of progress or patriotism, a statute was enacted to allow citizens of Pennsylvania serving in the army during
war periods to vote.6 This law was not tested till 1862, when in the
leading case of Chase v. Miller7 it was declared to be unconstitutional. The same result generally attended similar legislation of
'281 Pa. 13, 126 At. x99 (1924).
'Act of May 22, 1923, P. L 309.
'A list of the states having such legislation is given in the concurring
opinion of Clark, C. J., in Jenkins v. State Board of Elections of North
Carolina, iSo N. C. i69, 104 S. E. 346 (i920). Some constitutions expressly
provide for such mode of voting, o'nd even where this is not so, the constitutional question has seldom been raised.
'Straughn v. Myers, 268 Mo. Iso, 187 S. W. i359 (3936).
Jenkius v. State Board, supra, note 3.
'Act of July 2, 1839, P. L. 59, sees. 43-50.
'41 Pa. 403 (1862).
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other states.$ Popular feeling I caused the amendment of the constitution, which amendment was embodied in the present constitution,
to the effect that citizens in actual military service under requisition
from the President of the United States or by authority of the Commonwealth should not be deprived of the right to vote. It has been
held that this privilege can be neither abridged nor denied, and consequently on failure of the Legislature properly to provide for the
right of voting, a statute admittedly inappropriate and not intended
for the purpose should be invoked in order that the soldier should
not be deprived of his right. 10 But it seems that this provision does
not apply to volunteers in the Regular Army and is limited to members of the National Guard in active service or to members of
the Regular Army selected under conscription laws11
Such was the situation in Pennsylvania when the Absentee
Voters Act of 1923 came up for consideration. It was an act in-

tended for absentee voters generally, but on the authority of Chase.
v. Miller,12 which had to do only .with soldiers' voting, it was held
unconstitutional. The conclusion in Chase v. Millcr was undoubtedly sound. The statute provided that soldiers "may exercise the

right of suffrage at such place as may be appointed by the command-

ing officer of the troop or company to which they shall respec-

tively belong." This was a delegation of the legislative power to a
military officer; such a delegation was clearly unconstitutional. Consequently there was no election district and no constitutional voting.
But the court went further, and in construing the clause that the
elector must reside at least ten days in the district "wherie he offers
to vote," it held that this required the elector to appear in person and
cast his ballot. And this provision being in the present constitution
also,'3 Chase v. Miller was deemed to be binding authority.
It is indeed difficult to see how the clause "where he offers to
vote" involves the implied requirement of personal appearance. Perhaps Woodward, J., also felt the difficulty, for he offered no reasons
for his holding; nor does Sadler, I., in following him, suggest any.
The authorities in other states, besides being very few, are no more
helpful. " All must recognize that the clause has the primary func*The authorities are all gathered in 14 A. L. R. 1258.
'Woodward, ., who wrote the opinion, was severely criticized by the
public, and his candidacy for governor was defeated a little later; but -his
decision was very influential on courts of other states.
"Lansford Borough Election, 27 Pa. D. R. 611 (gx8).
"Re Vote of Soldiers, 27 Pa. D. R. io (19x8). This is the opinion of
the Attorney General and so is not authoritative, but it seems sound.
"Supra, note 1.
"The present provision now reads: "He shall. have resided in the election
district where he shall offer to vote at least two months immediately preceding the election." Constit. Pa. Art. VIII, sec. x, par. 3.

'Supra, note &
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tion of modifying the term "district." Besides qualifications of age'
and sex, the constitution requires citizenship in the United States
and residence in the state and in some voting district for some fixed
period. It is unnecessary to modify the noun "state" since of course
the constitution has to do only with its own state. But as there are
many voting districts, it is necessary to modify the term district in
order to associate the voter with his particular district. And so the
construction that personal appearance is required has the effect of
giving this subordinate clause another function, namely, that of adding another qualification required of the elector. In the constitution
the other qualifications are all set off in separate independent
clauses,' 5 but if personal appearance is also a qualification it is
found in the secondary meaning of a subordinate clause. The
thought has been thus expressed: "Does the assertion of this right
[to vote], or a claim to exercise it, constitute any part of the qualification of the voter? In other words, if he is of the right age, sex
and color, and has the requisite residence, is he not a qualified voter,
though he may not claim to exercise that right? If so, then how can
the claim of a right, already perfect, add to its completeness? Or
how can the place of asserting it figure in the qualifications ?1 '
But it might be asked why the phrase "offers to vote" should be
used if it wds not intended to convey the idea of personal preseitation. The answer is that the citizen may enjoy a right if he takes
the trouble to claim it, and offering to vote is one way of claiming it,
and until compulsory voting is required the elector will have to
continue to offer to vote or claim his vote. Since, then, the phrase is
necessary to an exact expression of the situation, a natural meaning
should be put upon it, and offering to vote by mail is no more unnatural than offering to contract by mail.1 T Hence, just as the construction of Chase v. Miller and of its descendant, Lancaster City's
Election, imposes on a subordinate clause two functions, so it requires of the verb "offers" (or "shall offer") a double duty also.
Such overburdening of subordinate clauses and single words with
meaning is in itself an argument against the construction and at
least suggests that it is strained and unnatural. However, if the proSee Constit. Pa- Art. VIII, see. x.

"1Per Wright, I., in Morrison v. Springer, 15-Iowa 304 (1863). A soldiers' voting act was held not to contravene the constitutional provisions demanding residence in the district in which the voter claims his vote. The
court held there was distinction between offering to vote and claiming one's
vote, but failed to say what the distinction was. Like most courts of the
period it was unduly impressed with the elaborate opinion of Woodward, J.
The California Sulreme Court held there was no distinction between the two
expressions, and that such provision made a soldiers' voting act unconstitutional. Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161 (x864).
" This was the construction put on it in Jenkins v. State Board, supra,
note 3. By such acts the voter applies by mail to the proper authorities, is
sent a ballot which he mails in, and his vote is added to the total of his
district.
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vision clearly and unambiguously did require personal appearance,
the draftsmanship and not the courts should be criticised. But in
what way these words convey such an idea no court has been able
to say. In the Pennsylvania cases no attempt to give reasons is
made; courts of other states, with more ambition, have been no more
successful.' The truth seems to be that there was a natural hostility to the idea of voting in any manner other than by personal appearance, and it must be admitted that the idea was new and outside
general experience at the time the problem first arose.'9 One judge,
indeed, proceeded on the theory that as the first impression made on
him was to require personal appearance, this was the natural meaning and implication.'" The courts were, moreover, struck by a matter which was none of their business, the possibility of wholesale
fraud.*2 In short, in the early cases the courts were guided by a
natural bias developing out of their experience and legal background.
But in the recent cases, where the problem was exactly the same, the'
courts without hesitation declared sfich acts constitutional, 2' and were
just as clearly of the opinion that the phrase "where he offers to
vote" had no peculiar meaning, as the older courts were of the opposite opinion. Neither side entertained doubts or brought out any striking reasons,2 3 and undoubtedly the modern view, if we may call it
such, is due to a more progressive attitude of the courts.
In view of this development, it would seem as though the Pennsylvania court could have reconsidered the problem, especially since
the statute of 1923 differed in principle and detail from that of
a839. But the court deemed Chase v. Miller to be binding authority.
Bourland v. Hildreth, supra, note 16, and Twitchell v. Blodgett, x3
.Mich. 12% (x865), both holding absentee voters acts unconstitutional under
'similar provisions, present elaborate opinions but vague and unsatisfactory
reasons.
"For of course the general method, extending over centuries, was by
casting of ballot in town meeting or election district. It .is said that this was
the common law method of voting.
Concurring opinion of Christiancy, .I., in Twitchell v. Blodgett, supra,
note i8; to this Martin, C. J., dissenting, answered at p. i80, "The first impression, upon reading an instrument, is no guide to construction. It is to
avoid that impression, that interpretation or construction becomes necessary."

" Personal appearance is no guaranty against fraud, however, and the
modem system of registration was devised to reduce the possibility of fraud.
"See, supra, notes 4 and 5. About forty of the states have absentee

voters laws, and as most of them have never been questioned, the modern
authorities are few. These two states have the same constitutional provision

as Pennsylvania, and the acts are similar.
" But the North Carolina court, as shown in the text above, showed how
readily the term "offers to vote" could be used in its natural meaning.
"In Opinion of Justices. So N. H. 595. 113 Atl. 293 (i921). the court
felt it was bound by the earlier case of Opinion of Justices. 44 N. H. 63S
(0863), which turned largely on the town meeting mode of election.

z8o
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It is, however, not at all clear that such is the case. That decision,
as already shown, turned on the invalid creation of election districts by military officers,2 5 and much space was devoted to the reasoning on that point. The construction of the clause "where he offers
to vote" was accomplished in a short paragraph, without reasons,
and the extreme brevity suggests that it was thrown off as a dictum.
Yet it is something more than that, for standing alone it would decide the case. But as the decision went off on a more fully devel-

oped point, it certainly is not of the strongest authority.2 8 Moreover, a court should be satisfied with the validity of the reasoning

of a decision before it adopts it as authority. To be sure, in this
case no reasoning would have been found, had any been sought; but

that would seem to be all the more reason for refusing to follow it
without further consideration. Besides, the doctrine of stare decisis

is not so strictly applied in constitutional construction, especially
where the refusal to follow a case would not be a violent blow at
property rights built upon the doctrine of that case.27 On this
point, then, Chase v. Miller might have been disregarded without
doing violence to legal reasoning or to the rights of the parties.2 8

Moreover, not satisfied, as it should have been if Chase v. Miller

was as binding as it thought, the court suggests other reasons. The
fact, says the court, that the constitution has a special provision for
soldiers argues that all other absentee voting was impliedly forbidden.

As a general proposition this may or may not be true; it is certainly
not so in this case, if the history of the subject is remembered. The
provision is an adoption of an amendment to the old constitution,
made, as we saw, in order to overcome the unpopular result of Chase
v. Miller; 29 to read into it any further meaning is to ignore the
' This was clearly pointed out in Jenkins v. State Board, supra, note 3.
" "If the case really was decided upon some point independent of the
point for which it is cited, then, even though it could have gone off upon
the latter point and even though the opinion as to the latter point is emphatic,
as to that point the case is not a strong authority, but is practically the equivalent of a dictum." W¥ambaugh, Study of Cases (2d ed.), sec. 56.
" Only a year ago Chief Justice Yon Moschzisker said: "There is much
to be said in favor of the view that, in constitutional cases, the doctrine of
stare decisis should not apply with undue severity." 31 HARV. L REV. 4o9,
42. See also is C. J. 945 and 7 R. C. L ooo as to a court's duty to follow
precedent.
" Perhaps the failure of the present court to go more thoroughly into
the subject is due to overwork and the necessity for an early decision in
election cases. Certainly the court seemed content to seize on words that
appeared to answer the problem, without further consideration.
2'It might be argued that if the legislature actually did have Chase v.
Miller in mind when it submitted the amendment, then it would have everything it said in mind also, and that it chose only to overcome the effect of the
case on soldiers voting and impliedly approved everything else said. But
doubtless the legislature was thinking only of the result of the case and not of
everything said.

NOTES

circumstances under which it was adopted. Another reason suggested but not decided is that the statute may violate the provision
for secrecy in voting.'0 However, this may be a privilege that can be
waived; 3 and even if this were not so, it would mean an invalidation only of this particular statute, without inolving the principle of
voting by mail.
Such, then, is the result of this legislation in Pennsylvania.
Where she attempted to lead, she has been prevented from keeping
pace with her sister states; and even a special constitutional provision
has been only partially successful. The fact that this result might
easily have been avoided aggravates the unfortunate outcome. Such
legislation has merits, and it seems anomalous, in view of some agitation to make voting compulsory, to deny a man his vote when he
has gone to some trouble to perform a public duty.
H.L.R.
"DoING BUSINESS" .%SINTERPRETED BY THE FEDERAL COURTS
UNDER TIE PROVISIONS OF TIlE CAPITAL STOCK TAx.-The federal
tax on corporations "with respect to carrying on or doing business"
was first imposed by the Tariff Act of 19o9 and has been included
in the various revenue acts since passed.' The United States Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the phrase "carrying on or
doing business" the following year in two cases, the. Park Realty

case"' and Zonne v. Minn. Syndicate.
Under the facts of the former case, the Park Realty Company
was organized to "work, develop, sell, convey, mortgage or otherwise

acquire property . . . and generally to deal in, sell, lease, exchange or otherwise deal with lands, buildings and other property,
real or personal." The corporation managed and leased a hotel, and
it was held that this was "doing business" under the act of igo9.

In his opini6n, speaking for the Court, Justice Day said: "It
is, therefore, apparent, giving all the words of the statute effect, that
the tax is imposed not upon the franchises of the corporation irrespective of their use and business, nor upon the property of the corporation, but upon the doing of corporate or insurance business and
'Art. VIII, sec.

4.

But under the act a voter's ballot would be known

as liis- only in the event that there was but one absentee voter in the district.
' As was held in Jenkins v. State Board, supra, note 3.
'Tariff Act of 19o9 and Revenue Acts of 19x6, 1918, 1921, 19z4. U. S.
Stat. at Large, Vol. 36, p. 112; Vol. 39, p. 789; Vol. 40, p. 1126; Vol. 42,
p. 294; Vol. 43, P. 325.

'Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (Park Realty Case), 22o U. S. io7 (igo).
'220 U. S. 187 (1911).
See accord, Wilkes-Barre & W. Va. Traction
Co. v. Davis, 214 Fed. 511 (1914); Maxwell v. Abrast Realty Co., 218 Fed.
457 (x9r4) ; Cambria Steel Co. v. McCoach, 225 Fed. 278 (1915); McCoach .
v. Continental Pass. Rwy. Co., 233 Fed. 976 (1916); West End St. Rwy. Co.
.r. Malley, 246 Fed. 625 (1917); Old Colony Rwy. Co. v. Gill, 257 Fed. =o
(1916).
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with respect to the carrying on thereof.

.

.

.

It is a tax upon

the doing of business with the advantages which inhere in the peculiarities of corporate or joint stock organizations." '
The Zonne case was decided a few days after the Park Realty
case, and defined the interpretation of "doing business" as applied
to a corporation organized to engage in a certain type of business
which had abandoned its original purpose and reduced its activities
to the mere leasing of its property and the distribution of the proceeds. The Court held that such a corporation was not "doing business," the corporation in this case having altered its charter "so that
its sole purpose was to hold title to the property in question and distribute the proceeds of the lease." "
Two.years later, in the leading case of McCoach v. Mine Hill
and Schuylkill Haven R. R. Co.,5 the principle that a corporation
which is organized for a certain type of business and subsequently
retires from that business and leases all its property is not "doing
business," was extended to include a corporation which maintainred
its corporate organization, made no change in its charter, and in
addition to receiving and distributing rentals, made certain investments and received interest and dividends therefrom. In reference to the retention of other powers, the exercise of which would
constitute "doing business," the Court said: "We cannot, however,
agree with the contention made in behalf of the Government that
because the Aline Hill Company retains its franchise of corporate
existence, maintains its organization, and holds itself ready to exercise its franchise of eminent domain, or other reserve powers, if
and when required by the lessee, and ready to resume possession of
the property at the expiration of the lease, it is, therefore, to be
treated as doing business, in respect of the railroad, within the meaning of the Corporation Tax Law." And in speaking of the receipt
of rentals and of interest and dividends from investments: "In our
opinion, the mere receipt of income from the property leased (the
property being used in business by the lessee and not the lessor),
and the receipt of interest and dividends from invested funds, bank
balances and the like, and the distribution thereof among the stockholders of the Aline Hill Company, amount to no more than receiving the ordinary fruits that arise from the ownership of the
property."
rn addition to the retention of various charter powers and the
making of investments which this decision held not to constitute
"doing business" under the statute, it was subsequently interpreted
by lower courts to apply similarly to the very exercise of a right of
eminent domain for the benefit of a lessee corporation.6 And a
*Id. 145.

See accord, State Line & S. R. Co. v. Davis,
2--8 U. S. 295 (oi13).
(1o&)'; Pub. Service R. Co. v. Herold. 220 Fed. 912 (1i16).
2,8 Fed. 2-16

ON. Y. C. & H. Rwy. Co. v. Gill, 219 Fed. 184 (19x5); Lewellyn v.
Pittsburgh B. & L E. R., 222 Fed. 177 (1915).

NOTES

similar attitude was taken by the courts as to borrowing by the lessor
corporation, either by selling bonds itself or by permitting the sale
of bonds by the lessee, the proceeds of which were to be used for the
permanent improvement of the property leased; 7 and as to payment
by the lessor of the cost of improvements made by the lessee.$
The extreme point to which this view has been extended is
represented by Jasper & E. Rwy. Co. v. Walker,9 where it was held
to apply though the lessor company both made and paid for the
improvements.
The earlier decisions both in the Supreme Court and in the
lower courts had laid some stress upon the fact that the corporations
which were organized primarily for some business other than the
holding and leasing of property had reduced their activities to that
alone. In U. S. v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Go.,10 the corporation
had been organized for the purpose of and did still own and lease
certain properties, distributing the rentals to its stockholders. The
Court ignored the distinction it.
had previously stressed and going
directly to the merits of the case, said: "The question is rather what
the corporation is doing than what it could do. The claimant's
characteristic charter function and the only one that it was carrying on, was the bare receipt and distribution to its stockholders of
rent from a specified parcel of land. Unless its bare existence as an
intermediary was 'doing business,' it is hard to imagine how it could
be less engaged." The corporation in this case received rent from
but a single lessee. The case is important as establishing the principle
that though a corporation may be engaged in the very activity for
which it was organized, yet that activity may not constitute "doing
business." Its application, however, has been limited because of the
peculiar nature of the facts. Denison, J., in Traction Cos. v. Col. of
Internal Revenue, 1 L holds the true test to be whether a corporation is
continuing the body and substance of the business for which it was
organized and in which it set out or whether it has substantially retired from such activity and turned it over to- another. The Emery
decision is explained under this theory on the ground of the realty
company's peculiar relation with its predecessor in title and its
associate company in active business. However, the Emery case has
recently been applied to a situation where no such special circum'Anderson v. Morris & E. R. R. Co., 216 Fed. 83 (1914); N. Y. C. & H.
Rwy. Co. v. Gill, supra, note 6; Phila. Traction Co. v. McCoach, 224 Fed.
8oo (195). See also Public Service Ry. Co. v. Herold, supra, note 5, where
bonds were sold by the lessor corporation.
*Miller v. Snake River Valley Co., 223 Fed. 946 (i9x5) : Waterbury Gas
Light Co. v. Walsh, 2-8 Fed. r4 (x915).
'238 Fed. 533 (19x7).
237 U. S. 28 (1915).
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stances were present,12 and this view seems more in accord with the
general principle quoted above from the opinion in the Emery case.
The case of V"on Baum bach v. Sargeant Land Co 3 represents the most recent view of the Supreme Court on the subject of
"dbing business," and its effect has been marked on subsequent cases
in the District Courts. Under the facts of this case, the Sargeant
Land Company had been organized "to unite in one ownership the
undivided fractional interest of its various stockholders in lands,
tenements and hereditaments, and to own such property, and, for the
ronvenience of its stockholders, to receive and distribute to them,
the proceeds of any disposition of such property at such times, in
such manner, and in such amounts as the Board of Directors may
determine." It owned a number of mine properties which it leased
under leases which had been executed prior to the date of organization of the corporation. In addition to the receipt and distribution
of rents and royalties, the corporation was engaged in the following
activities in the period under consideration: (i) It sold certain
lots, lands and stumpage. (2) It made explorations and incurred expenses in the matter of test pits. (3) It employed another corporation to supervise and inspect the work done by the lessees.
In holding the corporation taxable, the Court laid down a general rule applicable to all cases of this character: "The fair test to
be derived from a consideration of all of them is between a corporation which has reduced ifs activities to the owning and holding of
property and the distribution of its avails, and doing only the acts
necessary to continue that status, and one which is still active and is
maintaining its organization for the purpose of continued efforts in
the pursuit of profit and gain, and such activities as are essential to
those purposes." The Court took the view that the additional activities listed above took this case from under the Emery and Mine Hill
cases already discussed.
The decisions of the lower courts since the Sargeant Land Co.
case have shown a distinct tendency to enlarge the interpretation of
"doing business" to include any cases which on their facts do not
come directly under the Mine Hill or Emery cases, or those lower
court cases which have been cited as representing early applications
of the doctrines laid down in those decisions1 4
The large number of decisions and the varying interpretations
of the doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court have resulted in
-"Chile Copper Co. v. Edwards, 294 Fed. 581 (1923). A corporation was
organized for the purpose of receiving and did receive and distribute dividends of another corporation and financed that corporation, but was held
not to be "doing business."
W242 U. S. 5o4 (i916).
"See Assoc. Pipe Line Co. v. U. S.. 258 Fed. oo (99); Chemung Iron
Co. v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 36A (igo); Detroit Hotel Co. v. Brady, 25 Fed.
995 (x92); Lane Timber Co. v. Hynson, 2--9
Fed. 61g (x9z4). But cf. Chile
Copper.Co. v. Edwards, supra, note z2.
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some confusion as to the exact nature and extent of the activities
which constitute "doing business" within the purport of the statute.
It is submitted that the cases may be divided into two broad classes:
(i)those corporations engaged in the activities which were the purpose of their organization, and (2) those who have abandoned the
body and substance of the business in which they set out. If the
corporation falls in the former class, the question devolves into
whether those activities are "business," or whether the corporation
is acting merely as an instrument or intermediary for another. Corporations of the second class are held non-taxabli so long as their
activities are limited to the holding and leasing of property with
activities necessarily and properly incidental thereto. As to what
activities are "necessarily incidental," the most useful rule of thumb
is by analogy to the retired individual.' 5 It is not usually difficult to
tell whether a man is "in business," making continued efforts in the
pursuits of profit, or has retired and is engaged only in those activ'ities essential to that status.
W. .M.
INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN CRIMINAL Acs.-It was once the

-

universal opinion that the criminal jurisdiction of Chancery was
dead. That extraordinary power came into being contemporaneously
with the birth of the Star Chamber in the fifteenth century and it
should have passed into oblivion with that body.' When it was realized that this power was simply dormant, and had suddenly awakened panoplied, there was a storm of protest.' Its dangers, past
history showed; the limits of its exercise alone were not known. It
remained for the Supreme Court of California to say the bounds
were limitless and to couple a fifteenth century doctrine with a
philosophy then prevalent-that
it is better to seem to have virtues
3
than to really have them.
Ex parte Wood I is not only interesting for what the court does
by injunction but also for the reasons by which the court justifies its
action. Unable to find a single firm ground on which to rest its
decision, it runs the gamut of the grounds of equity jurisdiction
Traction Cos. v. Col. of Internal Revenue, note xr,supra.

'Edwin S. Mack, Revival of Criminal Equity, i6

HARv. L. R-v. 389
(19o3).
'Richard C. McMurtrie. Equity Jurisdictioni Applied to Crimes, 3i Ax.

. Rao. (N. S.) i (1892): Win. Draper Lewis, A Protest Against Administeridig Criminal Law by Injunction, 33 Asr. L. R.
(N. S.) 879 (1894);
Charles N. Gregory. Government by Injunction, ix HARV. L. RE . 487 (i898).

'AMachiavelli, The Prince, chap. 18.
4'227 Pac. 9o8 (Cal. z924). The defendant violated a temporary injunction
obtained by the State of California in proceedings against the I. W. IV. On
the basis of affidavits furnished the court the defendant was found guilty of
contempt.
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and uses them all. By decree it enjoins unnamed defendants from
conspiring: (i) to injure and destroy property; (2) to take over the
government and gain control of industry; (3) to circulate, print, or
distribute matter advocating or suggesting criminal syndicalism;
(4) to defend by word of mouth the necessity5 or propriety thereof;
(5) to do any acts to carry out their theories. The court without a
dissent justifies its decree because the state through equity may
enjoin a libel, or a public nuisance, and may supplement its criminal
law. Further, the court contends that the government should act
when property rights are thereatened. The fact that the defendants
could be indicted, says the court, is not enough because the defendants have violated the injunction. That in itself is proof that the injunction was the proper remedy. Then, as an afterthought, perhaps
not convinced of its right to act, the court adds "but it is well settled
that an injunction may issue to restrain the commission of acts
which are violative of public policy." 6
This last expression of the court was almost certainly the real
basis of the decree. How far it is justified will be examined later.
The other reasons assigned by the court must first be tested. The
publications, it seems, were treated as a libel on the -government.
When the court says it may enjoin a libel or publication apart from
any property right 7 it not only goes farther than precedent in equity
will warrant but it assumes that right in face of the cases it cites
to justify its contention. 8 The overwhelming weight of authority is
to the effect that injunctive relief will not be granted to restrain a
publication of a libel unless it also appears that irreparable damage
to property is involved..9 It is not the mere property right that will
cause equity to lend aid, but the certainty that without its aid the injured party cannot be adequately protected. The rule is much more
strict in the United States where freedom of speech is guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution," and by the constitutions oftheseveral states.
The English courts have departed from the rule that equity will not
enjoin a libel "' but that is because jurisdiction has been expiessly
IAt p. 9o9. The court pointsy out that the words of the injunction
were taken over almost bodily from the criminal statutes. Chap. 188, Amendments to California Code, igg.
'At p. 9"1.
The court finds no property right other than the right to protect its
citizens against the potential injury of expropriation or other means of control adopted by the I. W. W. should they take over the reins of governmentL
' Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D. C. 83 (i9o9); People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 203 Pac. 78 (19i).
'Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co.. 114 Mass. 69 (1873); New
York Juvenile Guardian Soc. v. Roosevelt. 7 Daly i88 (N. Y. 1877); Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Co., 197 Fed. 98- (D. C. 1912).
Amendments, Art. z.
" Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley. L R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868); Prudential
Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. xo Ch. i42 (1874).
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conferred by the Judicature Act. 12 Prior to the act it was also the
rule in England that the injured party was amply protected by the
criminal and civil law.
Particularly where the act sought to be enjoined was a crime
has equity withheld its remedy. The trial by jury is one of the
most cherished bulwarks of Anglo-American liberty.' 3 "It is no part
of the mission of equity to administer the criminal law of the
state." 14 Where equity granted relief though the act done was a
crime, it did so to protect tangible and real property rights,1' or
because the case fell within the class of nuisances, a field long recognized as proper for equitable relief.1 6 The criminality of the act
neither ousts nor gives Chancery jurisdiction."1 The California
court does not pretend that the acts in question were a public nuisance but satisfies itself with a quotation from Pomeroy that "the
injunction should be limited to cases closely analogous." 1 ' There
is no reason given why the acts done in this case were "closely analo-.
gous." What is or is not a public, nuisance is in many cases a difficult problem. The wisdom of increasing the difficulty already confronting the courts by adding to the scope of the injunction cases
"closely analogous" is not obvious. The phrase "closely analogous"
is certainly not one that makes for clearness.
The ordinary grounds of equitable jurisdiction, it is submitted,
were not sufficient to justify the injunction in this case. It remains
to be seen how far the last reason given by the court, that of public
policy, will justify the result. The Supreme Court of California
seems to be in mortal dread that if the propaganda used by the defendants in this case were permitted to circulate freely a change in the
form of government would inevitably result. But even if the danger
of a change in government is real it seems difficult, under a theory of
representative democratic government based on the consent and the
36 and 37 Vict., chap. 66, sec. 25, p. 8; Thorley's Cattle Foood Co. v.
Massam, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 763 (i88o); Collard v. Marshall, (1892) "ICh.571.
"The Supreme Court abandons trial by affidavits for trial by jury in a
very recent case. Michaelson v. U. S., Nos. z46 and 232 Adv. Opinions, Oct.
Term, 1924.
"'Cope v. Fair Ass'n, 99 Ill. 491 (i88o); also In re Sawyer, 1z4 U. S.
200 (1888).
"'Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 'ass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (i896); Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray,

go

Fed. 8I

(D. C. i897) ; Cumberland

Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assoc., 59 N. J. Eq. 49, 46 Atl. 2o8
(18wg).
"4People v. 'Truckee, x6 Cal. 397, 48 Pac. 374 (i897) ; Blagen v. Smith,
34 Ore. 384. 56 Pac. 292 (899); Commonwealth v. McGovern, ix6 Ky. 21m,
5 S.UW. 261 (19o3); Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Richardson, 194
ed. 198 (C. C. A. 191i) ; Pomeroy, Equity (4th ed., i919), sec. i9s6.
"In re Sawyer, x24 U. S.2oo (i888); Dean v. State, ix5Ga. 371, 107
S. E. (x92z).
"Supra, note 4 at p. 91x.
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will of the governed, to justify the suppression of arguments tending
to show the desirability of such a change.
The problem involved in this class of cases' was clearly outlined by the dissenting opinion of 'Mr. Justice Holmes in Vegelahn
v. Gunther.20 He said: "'The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose
the solutions can be attained merely by logic and general propositions which nobody disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely
are unanimbusly accepted and still more rarely, if ever, are capable
of unanswerable proof." Prior to the Debs case ' the "strong arm"
of equity 2 had been sparingly used and then only in isolated cases
where the question involved was one of public policy. 23 Not only is
the question one of policy, but this policy is in a constant state of
flux. This seems clear from an historical study of the cases.
It was once the law that though it was legal for one man to
ask for an increase in wages, yet when he agreed with another to
do the same thing each might be indicted for conspiracy.2 ' Two
years after the decision in Hornby v. Close 23 the attitude had begun
to change. The dissenting opinion in Farrerv. Close 28 suggests that
if the object is legal and no illegal means are used there can be no
'The group of cases to be discussed includes those relating to large
strikes in which the courts dealt with the problems before them on broad
principles of economics and policy though the suits may have been instituted
by private individuals or corporations on the theory that their private property rights were endangered.
"Supra, note xs.
"In re Debs, x58 U. S. 564 (z894).
" The injunctive relief has been thus characterized, "There is no power
the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case than
issuing an injunction; it is the strcng arm of equity that never ought to be
extended unless; to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford
an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear,
the injury impending or threatened so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction; but that will not be awarded in doubtful cases or new ones, not coming within well established principles; for if
it issues erroneously, an irreparable injury is inflicted, for which there can
')e no redress, it bein.z the act of a court, not of the party who prays for it."
-Per Baldwin. Jr., in Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co.. i Bald. 205
(U. S. C. C. 1830) at pp. 217-218. "This great writ for the enforcement of
equitable rights was not intended to be used as a short cut to escape the
inconvenience of a suit at law." Per Van Orsdel, t., in Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 33 Ap. D. C. 53 (19o9), at p. n2.
"Sherry v. Perkins. r47 Mass. 212. 17 N. . 307 0888); Braces Bros.
v. Evans. 5 Pa. C. C. 163 (i888); Murdock v. Walter, 152 Pa. 595, 25 At.
492 (1893).
"Rex v. Journeyman Taylors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. io (K. B. 172,);
King v. Mawbey, 6 Term. Rep. 6zo (1796); Rex. v. Hammond, 2 Esp. 719
(Westminster Sitting. 1799); liornby v. Close. L. R. 2 Q. B. i53 (1867).
'Supra. note 24.

" L R. 4 0. B. 6o2 (869).
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criminal conspiracy. " This view, now accepted by all courts, 2 was
at that time too radical for acceptance." However, it was used to
hold that a similar combination by employers was not illegal."0 Once
the right to combine for lawful ends such as shorter hours and better working conditions was generally recognized, there developed
great diversity as to the means by which and also as to the persons
through whom and upon whom pressure might permissibly be
exerted in order to bring the results desired.31 With regard to
picketing and boycott opinion is not definitely formulated. An exact
definition universally accepted has not been reached3 nor have the
various kinds of boycotts been clearly distinguished.3 3 The same
divergence is manifest in dealing with publications connected with
such united action by laborers. 3'
How far the state should take sides in these political and economic questions is incapable of definite answer. It is not so difficult to say that such questions should be answered hot by extensions
of equitable jurisdiction but by the legislative bodies, which are
closer to the people and better able to sense their views. Of course
when the legislature has determined that policy in a given situation
by enactment, and has conferred upon the court the right to act by
'Farrer v. Close, supra, note 26, per Hannen and Hayes, JJ., at p. 606,
et seq.
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met Mt (Mass. 1842); Local Union No.
313 v. Stathakis, i35 Ark. 86. 2o5 S. W. 450 (igi8) ; Auburn Draying Co. v.
Vardell, 7 N. Y. 1, i24 N. E. 97 (i919); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy. 35

HARv. L. REv. 393 (i92i). This article is a valuable contribution of sound
doctrines in a field where courts are still befogged.
' See Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HASv. L. Ray. 413-414.
" Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly 42 (Pa. 182!), by Gibson, J., Cf.
Philadelphia Cardwainers Society. 3 Commons and Gilmore, Documentary

History of American Industrial Society, pp. 59-248, reprint. Of the whole
situation Professor Sayre says: "A doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or
glory to the law: it is a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill considered thought." 35 HARV. L. REv. 393.
'Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 3- (192i), per Brandeis, J., at p. 362.
'State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 7 Ati. 89o (1887); Beck v. Railway
Teamsters Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (i898), Purvis v. United
Brotherhood. 214 Pa. 348, 63 At. 585 (i9o6); Wilson v. Hey, 232 IM.389,
8.3 N. E. 928 (19o8).
'Foster v. Retail Clerk's Assn., 38 Misc. N. Y. 717, 78 X. Y. S. Supp.
_,o2
(iu >3): Gill v. Docrr. 214 Fed. ill (D. C. 1914): Bossert v. Dhuy, 221
N. Y. 342. 117 X. E. 582 (1917); cf. note 28. supra. For picketing: Karges
Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated. etc., Union, 165 Ind. 421. 75 N. E. 877 (i9o5).
On this whole subject see the illuminating opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Truax v. Corrigan, supra, note 31.
' The publication was held lawful in Walters v. Retail Clerk's Union,
1o G,. 424, 47 S. E. 911 (i9o4) ; Truax v. Bisbee Local C. Ur. U., 19 Ariz.
3"9. 171 Pac. 12r (1918). The publication was held unlawful in Beck V.
Railway Teamsters Protective Union. ii8 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (898);
Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. zoii (D. C. 19o5).
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injunction, there is no objection to such action. The right of the
court is derived from the statute and not from any broad principles
off equtyr.
nIn
Ex parte Wood " the only statutes involved were those in
which the legislature had declared the acts complained of crimes. s 6
There was only on other case which reached the same result as
the principal case to which the court could refer as precedent. 37
Both cases go back to In re Debss which has been the starting
point of so much equitable interference.
The Debs case, when properly understood and confined, is correct, but it lends no support to the California or Kansas cases. The
United States Supreme Court found that the Government had a
property right in the protection of mails. Mr. Justice Brewer added
that the jurisdiction is based on the broader ground of a duty imposed on the United States which was incapable of being carried
out by any other authority. The imposition of the duty carried
with it the necessary implication that the Government had the power
to enforce those duties. The choice was the injunction or the army."
The Circuit Court .40 further had based its jurisdiction on its construction of a statute giving the courts equity powers in certain
cases. 41 The jurisdiction was clear, the propriety alone doubtful.
It is very unfortunate that the California court should have felt
it necessary to engage in judicial legislation and thereby violate
fundamental principles of "a court of conscience" in its blind profession of love for the Constitution and justice. The quotation used by
Mr. McMurtrie 4 2 as a warning might now be repeated as a realization:
"For an evil which is not felt and which is; therefore, considered
a trifle and little thought of, draws after consequences only so much
the more disastrous."
M.S.
WILL -ADMIRALTY FACE THE FAcTs?-The much-discussed
Jensen case and the line of cases applying its doctrine have firmly
established the proposition that a state cannot pass laws contravening the uniformity of admiralty law." Two factors go to show that
U

Supra, note 4.

"Supra, note 5.

'State

v. Howat. o9 Kanrt 376, 198 Pac. 686 (ig2i). This case con-

cerned an injunction issued by the Industrial Relations Court of Kansas.
'Supra, note 21.
21, at p. 582.

'Supra, note

United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C. C. A. 1894).
, She'rmnan Anti-Trust Act. Act of July 2. i8 o. 26 Stat. 2o9, sec. 4.
0
Supra. note 2. This article written at the beginning of the "age of injunction" still remains a guiding star for courts.
'Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 2o5 (1917); Clyde Steam-
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this uniformity is not the uniformity of the substantive law of the
sea in all its applications, but only such uniformity as is demanded
by the needs of maritime commerce and navigation: first, the reasoning of the Jcnsc, case that "no such [local] legislation is valid if
it works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and unifomity
of the law in its international and intersectional relations";2 and
second, the fact that state pilotage regulations,8 death acts,' and doinestic lien acts 5 are enforced in admiralty. Conversely stated, the
rule would be that local law can govern maritime matters only when
they are of purely local concern. Having delimited state legislative

powers only in this way, having defined only its limits by the use of
the word "uniformity," and having only very generally described that

uniformity as determined by the needs of maritime commerce and
navigation, the courts have yet to fix rules by which this vague generality is to be interpreted. Every legal. generality, however, becomes by the process of time and jtidicial decisions more precise and
specific. The problem of the courts is now the practical one of application, and the purpose of the present note is to find what indications
have already been given, and to what positions they will lead the
court, in regard to the application of state Vorkmen's Compensation
Acts to situations with maritime features.- We must, then, review
what appears to be the state of the law as announced by the United
States Supreme Court.
ship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S.

255 (1917); Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U. S. 372 (x98); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S.
249 (292o) ; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (x1); Grant SmithPorter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.. S. 469 (xgzz); Ind. Comm. of N. Y. v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U. S. 263 (2922); Danielsen v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair
('p3),
Y. 445,262139U.N.S.E.75669 (1923);
Co., 235
& Repair
Dry N. E.
Warren
Y. 439,
567 nDock
(2923),
139
cert.N.denied
Co., 235 v.N.Morse
cert. denied 262 U. S. 756 (x923); Connelly v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair

s

Co., 235 N. Y. 602 (2923), cert. denied ",62 U. S. 756 (1923) ; Alaska Packers
Assn. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., ig* Cal. 763, 218 Pac. 561, cert. denied 263 U. S.
v. Ind.
Aec. Comm.,
Gen'l Acc. & Lia. Ins.
722 (1924) ; Zurich
Red
v. Cal
Frait
G. Co.i91
Atlantic
722 Co.
(1924);
77, 218 Pac. 563, cert. denied 263 U.
Cross Line, 2 Amer. Mar. Cas. 418 (2924) ; The Allianca, 2 Amer. Mar. Cn
55x (2924) ; State v. Dawson, 2 Amer. Mar. Cas. 403 (2924).
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, .upra, note . For confirmation see
; but cI. Farrel v. Waterman SS. Co., 286 Fed. 2,
noteFupra,
cases cited,
r923).
286 (D .
o
Es parte Me.iel,
(r8-i);
U. S.
'Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
.
8o U. 5. 236 (871).
kg
U. S. 199 (i86); The Hmilton, 2o7 U. S. 398
'The Harrisburg,
(1938); for a recent interpretation see
S. 75220 U.
Bourggne,
t.a
(c9o7);
The James McGee, 300 Fed. 93 (D. C. . 4).
CThe Corsair, r45 U. . 335 (1892); The J. E. Rumbell, 48 U. S. :
See The City of Norfolk
(o3).
Mr8 .
(1893); The Roanoke, 89 U. S.
28 Fed. 98, o6 (D. C. 2893) for instances in which new legal rights, created
by state authority in maritime affairs, have been recognized and enforced.
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When the injury occurs upon land and the tort is therefore "nonmaritime," the application of such an act cannot violate uniformity
sinte there is no rule of admiralty law applicable in such a case. 6
When the tort is maritime but the contract is non-maritime because
the services are regarded as non-maritime, the application of such
an act will not contravend uniformity because non-maritime services7
are not a part of commerce And navigation as conceived in admiralty.
But when both tort and contract are maritime, the Jensen case holds
that admiralty law must govern.' So far, it would seem that such
a concurrence of maritime rights of action in tort and contract is a
sine qua non of the disturbance of admiralty uniformity; but is it to
be the final test? Many law review articles have so assumed., The
language of the Supreme Court in the Jensen case is noteworthy:
"The work of a stevedore in which the deceased was engaging is
maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract;
the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights
and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters
clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction." 10 This suggests that the
court regards the case exclusively through the medium of the
rights of action. But if the point to be determined is whether state
law interferes with that ufiiformity demanded by the best interests of
maritime commerce and navigation, it is not the rights of action but
the relation of the parties and the work to that commerce and navigation which will be determinative. This is a factual rather than a
legal question. In the cases already decided by the Supreme Court
the character of the work done has been considered only in the
light of the rules governing jurisdiction of maritime contracts, and
no attention has been paid to whether the parties involved are international and intersectional shipping men or men whose contacts are
purely local.2 If the international or intersectional character of the
' State Ind. Comm. of N. Y. v. Nordenholt Co., supra, note x.
'Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, supra, note i.
'Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, note 1.
'See notes in io CAL. L. Rv. 525 and 35 HARy. L. REv. 743.
"Southern Pacific Co. v.Jensen, supra, 217.
'It has been suggested that "the important consideration in these cases
seems to be not the effect of the statute on navigation but its effect on marnlime law," citing non-maritime liens on vessels, enforced in state courts. 35
HARv. L. REv. 745. n. ii. If this is so, then the position of the parties in
navigation or maritime commerce is immaterial. But the fact that a vessel is
an instrument of navigation does not afford it carte blanche to become involved in non-maritime affairs and yet be subject only to maritime law.
Uniformity is' probably sufficiently safeguarded by the priority of liens
for maritime claims over liens for non-maritime claims. See The Elexena,
53 Ved. 359 (D. C. 1892). And in the application of state Workmen's Compensation Acts, in determinihg the disturbance of the "uniformity of that law
in its international and interstate relations," (to quote the Jensen case), it
would seem that the international or interstate character of the parties
should be at least one,. if not the most important factor in determining
whether th- law is disturbed in its internalional and interstate relations, or
only in its local applications.

NOTES
parties is not a factor in determining whether the application of
state law did in fact interfere with maritime law in its international
and intersectional relations, then the presence or absence of maritime
rights of action in the decided cases may have been in fact indicative
of the status of the parties in maritime commerce and navigation..
But several possible situations suggest that this may not be true in
the future, and that new and additional rules must be evolved.
A case may arise involving maritime actions both in tort and
contract, and yet of purely local interest. Inasmuch as the principle
of uniformity allows local laws to' govern local matters, the state
act should be applied in spite of the presence of maritime actions.
The Georgia Court of Appeals has already reached this conclusion.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Bacoi 12 the state Workmen's Compensation Act was held applicable to one killed on navigable waters
of the United States in the performance of a contract to do local
fishing, because the work contracted for and perfbrmed "had no,
direct relation to navigation or maritime commerce, but was a purely
local matter." And in Bockhop v. Phoeni.r Trust Co.13 the New
Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held the state Workmen's
Compensation Act applicable to an injury occurring to one painting
a ferryboat afloat on the Hudson River, quoting the Rohde case that
the application of the local law cannot materially affect any
rules of the sea, whose uniformity is essenitial." If only local interests are involved, no reason is seen why they should be subject to a
different law from the local interests surrounding them. Here is
no inconsistency with maritime uniformity, even though the cases
piesent maritime rights of action.
The fact that Vorkmen's Compensation Acts provide for an
award in cases of pure accident suggests a further difficulty in looking to the rights of action involved as decisive of the question
whether there is a. disturbance of maritime uniformity. In such
cases there is no tort. Then, will the locality of the accident take.
the place of the locality which determines jurisdiction in tort? This
seems an arbitrary rule, with little reason to support it, particularly
since the locality test has come in for no little criticism."' The ques23o

Ga. App. 728, ri9 S. E. 458 (1923).

In this case there is the addi-

tional ground that both parties elected the state Workmen's Compensation
Act, and so did not contract consciously with regard to admiralty law. The
same view is advanced in Berry v. Donovan, 12o Me. 457, Xz5 At. 250
But the rule is that conduct of parties cannot establish jurisdic(1i92).
tion over a subject-matter otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of the court. For
application of this principle to the present problem, see Zurich Gen'l Ace. &
Lia. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm.. supra, note i; Duart v. Simmons, 231
Mass. 313. 128 N. E. 32 (igS8) ; Dorman's Case, 236 Mass. 583, i29 N. E.
352 (1921); Foppen v. P. J. Fase & Co., 219 Mich. 136, i88 N. W. 54z

(1gm).
1297 N. J. L 514, 117 Adt. 624 (1922).
"See Campbell v. Hackfeld & Co., 125 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 90o3): 16 HA-v.
L REv. 210; IS HARV. L REv. 299; and 5 CArL L REv. 49z. And cf. Scott v.
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tion will be: is this case before the court, on all its facts, so closely
connected with maritime commerce and navigation that application of
this local law will violate maritime uniformity? This is a question
of the actuality of the particular situation, and it is submitted that
all the facts of the situation should be considered in answering it.
It might be argued that the very basis of admiralty jurisdiction
is the desire for uniformity in the law applicable to cases arising
out of maritime commerce and navigation, that the lines of jurisdiction have been laid down with this in mind, and so the rights of
action are of necessity indicative of the relation of any set of facts
to uniformity. But uniformity in relation to jurisdiction means a
law uniformly accessible to all-maritime claims, local as well as international or intersectional, so that the presence of maritime rights of
action signifies that the situation is related to maritime commerce
and navigation in general, rather than in its international and intersectional aspects in particular.
There is still room for the argument found in Danielson v.
Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co.,15 that a decision of each case on its
particular facts would bring into the law of employer and employee
an uncertainty productive of much litigation and hardship. This objection is entitled to great weight, and suggests that in the rights of
action we already have a ready-made standard easily applied. Yet
the Supreme Court has not hesitated to determine on the facts the
position of parties in interstate commerce, until the positions have
become more and more definitely settled on one side of the line or
the other. The problems are very similar, and the status of parties
in intersectional and international commerce might well be worked
out in the same way. So there are two possible solutions, that the
Supreme Court will be satisfied with the imperfect test of rights of
action, or that the course of specification is still developing, .having
gone so far as rights of action but having still to peer beneath these
factors and recognize that the question is one of fact for which no
hard and fast rules can be laid down.
B.S.M.
Dept. of Labor and Industries, 228 Pac. 1013 (Wash. x924) where the court
held a tort to be non-maritime when the only damage was on navigable water,
although the negligence arose on land, unconnected with the ship. ". . . we
have little doubt that no federal court would sustain a proceeding in admiralty in this case for the damages sustained by respondent. The ship and its
master were in no wise at fault. It is clear that respondent could not bring
an action against the vessel, or an independent owner thereof, for his injuries under the' state of facts shown here." It is significant that this repudiation of the locality test, which has lately seemed triumphant in admiralty,
came in connection with the application of a state W~orkmen's Compensation
Act to a stevedore's injury.
"Supra, note i. "That would be to introduce an element of uncertainty,
production of litigation and hardship almost without limit. Neither workman nor employer would know his rights and remedies until the final word
had been spoken by the last appellate court. Too often the Statute of Limitations would then bar the substitution of the right choice for the wrong one."

NOTES
-THE ANNULMENT OF MIARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD.-

The rescission of contracts on the ground of fraud has been a traditional subject of equity jurisdiction. But the principles that govern the rescission of an ordinary contract are manifestly uncalculated
to control the annulment of marriage. Though marriage is a contract, it is one sui gcncris. It cannot be dissolved by mutual consent;
it is not a contract within the meaning of the statute of frauds; '
the state may impair its validity by the passage of divorce laws.'
The rights and obligations of the parties are fixed by the law, and
not determined by mutual agreement. Principles peculiarly its own,
based more on vital questions of public policy than on abstract contractual rights, govern the annulment of marriage procured through
fraud.
It is important at the outset to distinguish annulment from divorce. The latter is predicated on a: valid marriage; the former presupposes its invalidity. Divorce dissolves a previously binding rela-.
tionship for causes arising subsequent to the marriage, while annulment impeaches the marriage ab initio for causes existing at its
inception. A decree of annulment proceeds, therefore, on the theory
that no marriage ever existed.' Divorce statutes frequently enumerate
causes of annulment as grounds for divorce; but the power of a
court of equity to annul a marriage is inherent from the general
jurisdiction of that court over matters arising out of contract, and
is not based on the statute.' While the courts of equity are thus
clothed with jurisdiction, the peculiar nature of the subject requires
that Certain
the power should be exercised with extreme caution.
causes are everywhere recognized as grounds for annulment. Since marriage is a contract, a mutual agreement is required. Circumstances showing a lack of free and .intelligent consent without which a contract cannot be legally formed are therefore grounds for annulment. A marriage procured by force or duress
is voidable at the bption of the injured party.5 The marriage of an
insane person is void,6 unless ratified during lucid intervals.t IntoxiILewis v. Tapman, go Md. 294, 45 Atl. 459 (igoo). Contra, Barge v.
Haslam, 63 Neb. 296, 88 N. W. 516 (i9ox).
'Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. i9o (1887).

"Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, x78 S. W. 175 (1915); Millar v.

Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917).
*Henneger v. Lomas, r45 Ind. 287, 4 N. E. 462 (1896); Avakian v.
Avakian, 69 N. J. Eq. 89, 6o At. 521 ( igo); Wimbrough v. Wimbrough,
x25 Md. 61g, 94 Ad. 168 (1915); but see Pitcairn v. Pitcairn, 2ox Pa. 368,
5o AtL 963 (1902).
40

'Avakian v. Avakian, supra, note 4; Marsh v. Whittington, 88 Miss: 400,
So. 326 (1906) ; Quealy v. Valdron. 126 La. 258, 52 So. 479 (19io).

'True v. Ranney, 21 N. H. 52 (85o) ; Sims v. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 28
S. E. 407 (1897); \Vaughop v. Waughop, 82 Wash. 69, 143 Pac. 444 (1912).
The insanity must be of such a kind as to render the party incapable of
understanding the nature and obligations of the marriage. Where a wife
was a kleptomaniac, but was otherwise sane, a decree of nullity was refused.
Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323 (1890).
'Gross v. Gross, 96 Mo. App. 486, 70 S. W. 393 (9o2) ; but see Sims v.

Sims, supra, note 6.
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cation, if so profound as to dcprive the party of all reason and comprehension of what he is doing, is sufficient to annul a marriage entered into in that condition." Certain physical disabilities and diseases which render it impossible or dangerous to consummate marriage are likewise grounds of annulment. Capability of consummation is an implied term of every marriage contract; so that impotency, or the inability of one of the parties to sustain sexual relations,
is cause for annulment." The same is true if one of the parties is
afflicted, with venereal disease.10 In many states there are statutory
provisions regulating or forbidding certain marriages. The age of
competency is generally fixed by statute 11 so that the marriage of
a person below that age is voidable at the election of the party under
age, to be exercised at any time before reaching such age 1 2 or afterward, if the parties have not confirmed the marriage by voluntarily
cohabiting as husband and wife after reaching the age of consent.'8
Frequently marriages between relatives of certain degrees are forbidden. Such a marriage will be annulled at the instance of either
patty, though the applicant may have knowingly and wilfully entered into the relationship. 4 In some states marriage between white
persons and negroes," and between whites and Indians,26 are forbidden, and are expressly declared to be absolutely void.
The annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud presents
more troublesome features. Fraud is a well-known ground for rescission of contracts in equity; but its effect on the riullity of marriage is far more limited than in the case of an ordinary contract, for
marriage is regulated by considerations of public policy which are
paramount to the rights of the parties. The public interest in the
permanency of the marriage relationship requires that it should not
be disturbed for trifles. Fraud which would be sufficient to rescind
an ordinary contract will not destroy a marriage contract, unless
SPrine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, x8 So. 781 (x8gs); but see Elzey v.
Elzey, I Houst. 308 (Del. 1857) where a statute did not specify intoxica-

tion as grounds for nullity.
aL v. B., (1895) Prob. 274; S. v. S., z92 Mass. z94, 77 N. E.

zx9o6).'

zo5

"Smith v. Smith, 17x Mass. 4o4, 50 N. E. 933 (0898); Svenson v.
Svenson. 178 N. Y. 54, 70 N. E. i2o (9o4);
C. v. C., 1$8 Wis. 3ox; r48
N. W. 865 (1914).

"At common law, the age of consent to the marriage contract was
fourteen years for males and twelve years for females. See 2 Schouler,
Marriage and Divorce, sec 112.
"Eliot v. Eliot, 77 Wis. 634, 46 N. IV. 8o6 (89o).
"Smith v. Smith, 84 Ga. 440, 11 S.E. 496 (889); Henneger v. Lomas,
supra, note 4.
"Martin v. Martin, s4 IV. Va. 3or, 46 S. E. 120 (i9o3).
'See Locidayer v. Locklayer, i39 Ala. 354, 35 So. ioog (i9o3); Moore
v. Moore, 3o Ky. L Rep. 383, 98 S. NV. 1027 (1907).
" See In re Walker's Estate, 5 Ariz. 70, 46 Pac. 67 (1896).

NOTES

that fraud was such that it went to the very essence of the marriage
relationship. What constitutes the essence is often difficult to determine. The English courts have formulated a rule which is simple
and easily applied, but in many instances works incredible hardship.
It is thus stated in Swift v. Kelly: ":
"It should seem to be the general law of all countries as it certainly is in England, that unless there be some positive provision of
statute law requiring certain things to be done in a specified mannei,
no marriage shall be held void merely upon proof that it had been
contracted upon false representations, and that but for such contrivances, consent never would have been obtained. Unless the party
imposed upon has been deceived as to the person, and thus has given
no consent at all, there is no degree of deception which can avail to
set aside a contract of marriage knowingly made."
The only fraud which is sufficient to annul a marriage in England is thus deception as to identity; that is, where a party marries
another upon that other's representation that he is A when in fact
he is B. With this exception, if the parties were capable of consenting, and did in fact consent, they are bound by their acts, regardless of the amount of deception practiced on either of them.
Applying these principles, an English court in the famous case of
Moss v. Moss 18 refused to annul a marriage at the suit of a husband who discovered two months after marriage that his wife was

pregnant by another man.

In the United States, relief for fraud is more widespread than
in England, because of a greater liberality of view as to what facts
go to the essentials of the marriage relationship. As a general rule,
fraudulent representations or concealment of personal traits or attributes, such as health, 9 disposition,2 0 rank,21 condition, 2 or wealth,
ff3

Knapp

257

(Eng.

(2897) Prob. 263.

1835).

23
Concealment of the following diseases has been held no ground for
annulment: epilepsy, Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Il1. 366, 8z N. E. 850 (1907); contra,
McGill v. McGill, 99 Misc. 86, 163 N. Y. Supp. 462 0 917); insanity, Cum-

mington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. M (i889); Lewis v. Lewis, supra, note
6. Concealment of tuberculosis was held to be a ground for annulment in
Sobol v. Sobol, 88 Misc. 217. i5o N. Y. Supp. 248 (19I1); Davis v. Davis,
go N. J.Eq. x58, io6 Atl. 644 (i919).
'Misrepresentation of mildness of temper and amiability of disposition was held no grounds for annulment. Williamson v. Williamson, 34
App. D. C. 536 (i9io).
" False representation that a man was of good character and good standIng in society, and that he had many respectable relations and connections
when in fact he was a convict and had served several terms in the penitentiary was held no ground for annulment. Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa 1o7 (187);
contra, Brown v. Scott, 140 lid. 266, 117 Atil. 114 (1922).
'Concealment by a woman before marriage that she wore a glass eye
was held no ground for annulment. Kraus v. Kraus, 6 Ohio N. P. 248

(1899).
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are insufficient to destroy a marriage. Concealment of ante-nuptial
unchastity is likewise insufficient.2 3 These are considered accidental
qualities which do not constitute the essential and material elements
on which the marriage relation is based. But misrepresentations of
something making impossible the performance of the marriage relationship, or rendering its assumption or continuance dangerous to
health or life, are sufficient for annulment.-" Under this view, it has
been held repeatedly in the United States that ante-nuptial pregnancy
lany courts refuse to
by another man is cause for annulment.2
extend this view, and hold that the only fraud which will avoid a
marriage is such as would prevent either party from entering the
marriage relation, or having entered it, would preclude performance of the duties which the law and custom impose upon husband
or wife as a party to the contract."' Frequently, however, courts
have gone far beyond this, and have decreed annulment for fraudulent representations which did not in any way affect the ability of
the parties to cohabit as husband and wife. The courts of New
York have gone furthest in this matter, where it is held that any
misrepresentation of a material fact, made with intent to induce the
other party to enter into the marriage agreement, and without which
it would not have been made, authorizes the vacation of the marriage.27 The decisions in New York have resulted from a greater
of the courts, and have been reached
liberality of view on the part
28
independent of any statute.
9
a difficult and embarIn the recent case of Oswald v. Oswald,"
rassing problem of this nature was presented to the Supreme Court
'Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 8 N. IV. 739 (i88I); Allen's Appeal,
99 Pa. z96 (1882) ; but see Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N. H. 177, io6 Atl. 493 (i919).
In Smith v. Smith. 8 Ore. 1oo (1879), and in Shrady v. Logan, 17 Misc. 329,

4o N. Y. Supp. ioio (i896), the concealment of even the birth of an illegitimate child was held insufficient.
'Lyon v. Lyon. supra, note i9; and see cases, supra, notes 9 and io.
'Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 6o5 (Mass. 1862); Harrison v. Harrison, 94 Mich. 559, 54 N. W. 275 (1893); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 57 N. 3. Eq.
222, 4o At. 679 (i&j8).
'Trask v. Trask, 114 Me. 6o, 95 Atl. 352 (1915).
"Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E.63 (i9o3).
' The followinqr have been held grounds for annulment, in New York:
concealment of tuberculosis, Sobol v. Sobol, supra, note ig; misrepresentation of antenuptial chastity, Domschke v. Domschke, x38 App. Div. 454, 122
N. Y. Sup.. 892 (i91o); false representation that husband would put his
money together with wife's and buy a hotel after marriage, Robert v. Robert,
366 (i94); concealment of prior marriage,
87 Misc. 629, i5o N. Y. Supp.
Weill v. Weill. 104 Misc. 5 6 1, 172 N. Y. Supp. 589 (9x8); false representation as to p2st life. Libman v. Libman. 102 Misc. 443. 169 N. Y. Supp. 9o
f'cjgS): refusal to have Jewish ceremony performed after civil one had
been performed, Rubinson v. Rubinson. 1io Misc. 114, 181 N. Y. Supp. 28
(1920); Watkins v. Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, 189 N. Y.Supp. 86o (I:'));
contra, Schachter v. Schachter, io9 Misc. 152, 178 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1i99).
* z26 At. 81 (Md. 1924).

NOTES

of .Maryland. There the plaintiff sued for annulment, alleging that
prior to his marriage to the defendant in 1913 she represented to
him that she had been previously married, but that her husband was
then dead; that he, believing these representations to be true, married her according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, of
which he was a devout member; that in 1922 he discovered that her
former husband was still living, but that she had been divorced from
him before her marriage io the plaintiff; and that according to
the Roman Catholic religion, his marriage to a divorced woman was
void, so that it is impossible for him to live with the defendant. No
children were born of the marriage. The Supreme Court of Maryland refused a decree of nullity, on the ground that the marriage,
being legal by the law of the land, would not be annulled because
illegal by the law of the Church.30 The hardship of the case is apparent. Cohabitation with the defendant, though Jawful, would be
adultery to the plaintiff, for which he would be liable to excom-munication by his church. His religion forbids him to recognize.
the defendant as his wife; the law compels him to acknowledge her

as such.
In those jurisdictions which hold that the only fraud which is
sufficient to annul a marriage is that which makes the assumption
and continuance of the marriage relation physically impossible or
dangerous, 31 there can be no question about the correctness of the
present decision. Under the liberal view that prevails in New York,
it is equally probable that annulment would have been decreed. Two
years previous to the present decision the Supreme Court of Maryland adopted a broader view than that which it announced in the
principal case, and more in accord with the liberal attitude of the
New York court. In the case of Brouw v. ScottJ8 2 the defendant induced the plaintiff to marry him by falsely representing that he was
a college graduate, a former officer in the army, and a member of a
good family when in fact he was a professional swindler and had
served scveral terms in the penitentiary. There was nothing in that
case which made the performance of marital relations physically im-"
possible: yet the Supreme Court of Maryland granted a decree of annulment in that case, and refused it in the principal one. It is difficult to reconcile the decision in the present case with that in the
previous one. Few courts would have gone so far as did the
Supreme Court of Maryland in Brozwn v. Scott; 33 yet having prepared the way in that case, the court refused to adopt a liberal attitude in the present one. If a court once departs from the view that
'Accord. Boehs v. Hanger. 69 N. J. Eq. TO. 59 At. 9o4 (ioos); Wells
v. Talham, xi8o Wis. 654, 194 N. V. 36 (1923); see also Trask v. Trask,
supra. note 26.
' See supra, notes 24 and 26.
' Supra, note 21.

' See supra, note 2t.
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the only fraud which will justify the annulment of a marriage is
that which makes the performance of the duties of marriage physically impossible, as the Supreme Court of 'Maryland did in Brown v.
Scott, the determination of what fraud will he sufficient to annul a
marriage must necessarily become a matter of judicial discretion, to
be exercised according to the necessity of each case; and it would
seem that the exercise of such discretion would have resulted in a
decree of nullity in a case as hard as the present one.
I. M. M.

